FABRE, Cecile
A philosophical argument for a bill of rights - jan.2000
This article seeks to show that the rights which protect people's autonomy should be entrenched in the constitution of a dmocractic state. It is firmly located in egalitarian liberal tradition, as it takes for valid the following claims: (1) people have a fundamental interest in autonomy; (2) people have rights that their interest in autonomy, and the interests to which it gives rise, be protected and promoted; (3) people's respective interests in autonomy must be protected equally. The argument for a bill of rights unforlds as follws: first, it is argued that we have autonomy-protecting rights not only against private individuals but also against the state, and the meaning of having such rights against the state is explanined, then it is shown that it is legitimate to turn certain autonomy-protecting moral rights into legal rights, and that it is legitimate to turn certain autonomy-protecting moral rights into legal rights, and that doing so in the case of the rights we have against the setae amounts to turning them into constitutional rights; lastly, two objections to the argument deployed earlier are countered
A philosophical argument for a bill of rights - jan.2000
This article seeks to show that the rights which protect people's autonomy should be entrenched in the constitution of a dmocractic state. It is firmly located in egalitarian liberal tradition, as it takes for valid the following claims: (1) people have a fundamental interest in autonomy; (2) people have rights that their interest in autonomy, and the interests to which it gives rise, be protected and promoted; (3) people's respective interests in autonomy must be protected equally. The argument for a bill of rights unforlds as follws: first, it is argued that we have autonomy-protecting rights not only against private individuals but also against the state, and the meaning of having such rights against the state is explanined, then it is shown that it is legitimate to turn certain autonomy-protecting moral rights into legal rights, and that it is legitimate to turn certain autonomy-protecting moral rights into legal rights, and that doing so in the case of the rights we have against the setae amounts to turning them into constitutional rights; lastly, two objections to the argument deployed earlier are countered
