APPERLEY, Alan
Liberalism, autonomy and stability - apr.2002
Supporters of liberal neutrality distinguish between `weak' conceptions of autonomy which operate as background features of liberal democractic regimes, and `strong' conceptions, which amout to conceptions opf the good. These latter are to be excluded from the political realm on the grounds that in order to protect and promote a conception of the good, in the context of a pluralistic society, the state would have to resort to illiberal methods. The result of this will be the destablization and fragmentation of the regime. In this article I argue two things: first, that autonomy ought to be understood, not as a neutral background assumption of liberal theory, but as a partially comprehensive conception of the good in its own right; secondly, that protecting and promoting autonomy need not lead either to illiberalism or to the destabilization and fragmentation of liberal democratic society
Liberalism, autonomy and stability - apr.2002
Supporters of liberal neutrality distinguish between `weak' conceptions of autonomy which operate as background features of liberal democractic regimes, and `strong' conceptions, which amout to conceptions opf the good. These latter are to be excluded from the political realm on the grounds that in order to protect and promote a conception of the good, in the context of a pluralistic society, the state would have to resort to illiberal methods. The result of this will be the destablization and fragmentation of the regime. In this article I argue two things: first, that autonomy ought to be understood, not as a neutral background assumption of liberal theory, but as a partially comprehensive conception of the good in its own right; secondly, that protecting and promoting autonomy need not lead either to illiberalism or to the destabilization and fragmentation of liberal democratic society
