BALLA, Steven J
Legislative sucess and failure and participation in rule making - jul. 2000
This article addresses the relationship between legislative success and failure and participation in bureaucratic policy making. It specifically examines the hypothesis that the parties upon which regulations are expected to impose costs participate more extensively in the rule-making process than the expected beneficiaries of regulations do. The analysis focuses on the submission of comments on a regulation, promulgated by the Health Care Financing Administration, that reformed the way in which the medicare program pays for physician services. The results provide little evidence that physician specialties that expect decreases in payment under the new system submitted more comments than specialties that expected increases in payment. This finding is contrary to expectations drawn from prospect theory, research on benefits, costs, and political participation, and the conventional wisdom on participation in rule making. More broadly, it highlights the need for additional research on the use and influence of participatory instruments, which potentially enhance the extent to which bureaucratic agencies are accountable to elected officials and their constituents
Legislative sucess and failure and participation in rule making - jul. 2000
This article addresses the relationship between legislative success and failure and participation in bureaucratic policy making. It specifically examines the hypothesis that the parties upon which regulations are expected to impose costs participate more extensively in the rule-making process than the expected beneficiaries of regulations do. The analysis focuses on the submission of comments on a regulation, promulgated by the Health Care Financing Administration, that reformed the way in which the medicare program pays for physician services. The results provide little evidence that physician specialties that expect decreases in payment under the new system submitted more comments than specialties that expected increases in payment. This finding is contrary to expectations drawn from prospect theory, research on benefits, costs, and political participation, and the conventional wisdom on participation in rule making. More broadly, it highlights the need for additional research on the use and influence of participatory instruments, which potentially enhance the extent to which bureaucratic agencies are accountable to elected officials and their constituents
