EPSTEIN, David
Delegating powers : a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers - Cambridge : Cambridge University, 1999 - 319 p.
1. Paths of policy making The politics of military base closings Delegating powers: the puzzle A transaction cost politics approach Delegation and broad themes in american politics Outline of the book 2. Choosing how to decide Legislative organization Delegation and overnight Why delegate? 3. Transaction cost politics Lessons from the theory of the firm A theory of transaction cost politics The political hold-up problem 4. The decision to delegate The elements of policy making Equilibrium actions and outcomes Testable predictions 5. Data and postwar trends Data sample Delegation ratio Constraints Total discretion Postwar trends in executive discretion 6. Delegation and congressional-executive relations Divided government: the debate Discretion and divided government Roll calls over delegation Vetoes and delegation The structure of delegation: to whom do you delegate? Testing for strategic delegation Implications of divided government for public policy 7. Delegation and legislative organization Perspectives on legislative organization Committee outliers in a system of separate powers Committees, parties, and delegation Legislative procedures and executive discretion 8. Delegation and issue areas Issues, delegation, and public laws Issues areas and information Delegation and distributive politics 9. Conclusion The grand regression: integrating theories of american political institutions Separation of powers in the United States
0521669603
Poder
Delegação de Competência
Desenvolvimento Político
Estados Unidos
Delegating powers : a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers - Cambridge : Cambridge University, 1999 - 319 p.
1. Paths of policy making The politics of military base closings Delegating powers: the puzzle A transaction cost politics approach Delegation and broad themes in american politics Outline of the book 2. Choosing how to decide Legislative organization Delegation and overnight Why delegate? 3. Transaction cost politics Lessons from the theory of the firm A theory of transaction cost politics The political hold-up problem 4. The decision to delegate The elements of policy making Equilibrium actions and outcomes Testable predictions 5. Data and postwar trends Data sample Delegation ratio Constraints Total discretion Postwar trends in executive discretion 6. Delegation and congressional-executive relations Divided government: the debate Discretion and divided government Roll calls over delegation Vetoes and delegation The structure of delegation: to whom do you delegate? Testing for strategic delegation Implications of divided government for public policy 7. Delegation and legislative organization Perspectives on legislative organization Committee outliers in a system of separate powers Committees, parties, and delegation Legislative procedures and executive discretion 8. Delegation and issue areas Issues, delegation, and public laws Issues areas and information Delegation and distributive politics 9. Conclusion The grand regression: integrating theories of american political institutions Separation of powers in the United States
0521669603
Poder
Delegação de Competência
Desenvolvimento Político
Estados Unidos
