MOTTA, Daniel augusto
Political economy of preferential : the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation - São Paulo : Editora 34, jul. /set. 2007
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg coalition-proof equilibrium defines t the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economys negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case
Political economy of preferential : the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation - São Paulo : Editora 34, jul. /set. 2007
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg coalition-proof equilibrium defines t the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economys negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case
