POLLACK, Mark A.
The new institutionalism and EC governance : The promise and limits of institutional analysis - Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, October 1996
The "new" institutionalisms" in rational choice and historical analysis are being applied with increasing sophistication and accuracy to the study of European Community governance. The basic premise of such institutional approaches is that EC institutions, once created, "take on a life of their own," acting as independent or intervening variables between the preferences and power of the member governments on the one hand, and the ultimate policy outputs of EC governance on the other. The challenge for institutionalist theory consists in constructing a precise analytical tool-box that will allow us to make specific predictions about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, EC institutions may exert such an independent causal influence. EC institutions matter, I suggest, insofar as they: lend stability to an existing institutional structure; shape any subsequent amendment of those institutions; allow individual member governments to be outvoted by qualified majority; cause member states to lose control of events through lock-ins; and subject member governments to the actions of supranational agents whose behavior they can control only imperfectly.
The new institutionalism and EC governance : The promise and limits of institutional analysis - Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, October 1996
The "new" institutionalisms" in rational choice and historical analysis are being applied with increasing sophistication and accuracy to the study of European Community governance. The basic premise of such institutional approaches is that EC institutions, once created, "take on a life of their own," acting as independent or intervening variables between the preferences and power of the member governments on the one hand, and the ultimate policy outputs of EC governance on the other. The challenge for institutionalist theory consists in constructing a precise analytical tool-box that will allow us to make specific predictions about the ways in which, and the conditions under which, EC institutions may exert such an independent causal influence. EC institutions matter, I suggest, insofar as they: lend stability to an existing institutional structure; shape any subsequent amendment of those institutions; allow individual member governments to be outvoted by qualified majority; cause member states to lose control of events through lock-ins; and subject member governments to the actions of supranational agents whose behavior they can control only imperfectly.
