LAZER, David
Regulatory interdependence and international governance - 2001
The objective of this paper is thereefold: First is to produce a broad framework of the ways that state regulatory policies are interdependent. Second is to examine the factors that determine the nature of that interdependence. Third is to discuss the governance implications of different types of regulatory interdependencies. This analysis is applied to the spread of a new international fish inspection regulatory regime. I propose three modes of regulatory interdependence competitive, coordinative, and informational. The key assumption in the competitive mode of regulatory interdependence is that states are caught in a prisoner`s delemma - either because states use social regulation as a protectionist tool or because states undercut each other`s regulations in a race to the bottom. In the coordenative mode of interdepence it is assumed that there are certain benefits to having regulations that are compatible with those of other states - sometimes resulting in a race togher, or a race to the top. Finally, in the informational mode of interdependence, it is assumed that states are coping with massive uncertainty as to their best policy options. The regulatory choices of other states provide signals (and often much data) to good policy options
Externality
Governance
Institutional Analysis
International Law
Regulations
Standards
Regulatory interdependence and international governance - 2001
The objective of this paper is thereefold: First is to produce a broad framework of the ways that state regulatory policies are interdependent. Second is to examine the factors that determine the nature of that interdependence. Third is to discuss the governance implications of different types of regulatory interdependencies. This analysis is applied to the spread of a new international fish inspection regulatory regime. I propose three modes of regulatory interdependence competitive, coordinative, and informational. The key assumption in the competitive mode of regulatory interdependence is that states are caught in a prisoner`s delemma - either because states use social regulation as a protectionist tool or because states undercut each other`s regulations in a race to the bottom. In the coordenative mode of interdepence it is assumed that there are certain benefits to having regulations that are compatible with those of other states - sometimes resulting in a race togher, or a race to the top. Finally, in the informational mode of interdependence, it is assumed that states are coping with massive uncertainty as to their best policy options. The regulatory choices of other states provide signals (and often much data) to good policy options
Externality
Governance
Institutional Analysis
International Law
Regulations
Standards
