THATCHER, Mark
The commission and national governments as partners : EC regulatory expansion in telecommunications 1979-2000 - August 2001
General integrationist models undeline conflicts between the Commission and national governmetns. Thet cite telecommunications as an exemplar of the Commission imposing its choices on unwiling member states. However, a close examination of the development of substantive EC regualtion in telecommunications shows that the Commission and national governments acted in partnership. Major conflicts concerned constitutuional issues rather than substantive ones. How and why the partnership came to exist in analysed using a principal-agente framework. The article argues that formal and informal institutional controls made the Commission very sensitive to the preferences of national governments in substantive EC telecommunications regulation, resulting in partnership in developing substantive EC regulation. Four processes whereby such controls operated were: the participation of national governments at all stages of decisio-making; incrementalis; compromises and linkages; national discretion in implementation. In contrast, effective controls and processes did not apply to constitutional issues, leading to conflict rather than co-operation between the Commission and governments
European Comminssion
Principal-Agent
Regulation
Telecomunications
The commission and national governments as partners : EC regulatory expansion in telecommunications 1979-2000 - August 2001
General integrationist models undeline conflicts between the Commission and national governmetns. Thet cite telecommunications as an exemplar of the Commission imposing its choices on unwiling member states. However, a close examination of the development of substantive EC regualtion in telecommunications shows that the Commission and national governments acted in partnership. Major conflicts concerned constitutuional issues rather than substantive ones. How and why the partnership came to exist in analysed using a principal-agente framework. The article argues that formal and informal institutional controls made the Commission very sensitive to the preferences of national governments in substantive EC telecommunications regulation, resulting in partnership in developing substantive EC regulation. Four processes whereby such controls operated were: the participation of national governments at all stages of decisio-making; incrementalis; compromises and linkages; national discretion in implementation. In contrast, effective controls and processes did not apply to constitutional issues, leading to conflict rather than co-operation between the Commission and governments
European Comminssion
Principal-Agent
Regulation
Telecomunications
