MARTIN, Steve
What works and for whom? the competing rationalities of `Best Value` - 2001
This article argues that the UK Best Value regimen is rooted in `rational` model of strategic planning that privileges performance management and external inspection and implicity denigrades traditional forms of representative democracy. This poses important questions about how and by whom Best Value is to be defined. Central government has stressed tha need for political leadership of and public involvement in Best Value. However, the regime suggests a managerial role for elected members that many councillors find unattractive. Current reforms also assume a much greater degree of public engagement than many authorities are achieving. As a result, key decisions about local public service provision may increasingly be driven by centrally determined priorities and the judgements of external inspectors whose local accountability is unclear and whose claim to superior technical knowledge remains unproven
What works and for whom? the competing rationalities of `Best Value` - 2001
This article argues that the UK Best Value regimen is rooted in `rational` model of strategic planning that privileges performance management and external inspection and implicity denigrades traditional forms of representative democracy. This poses important questions about how and by whom Best Value is to be defined. Central government has stressed tha need for political leadership of and public involvement in Best Value. However, the regime suggests a managerial role for elected members that many councillors find unattractive. Current reforms also assume a much greater degree of public engagement than many authorities are achieving. As a result, key decisions about local public service provision may increasingly be driven by centrally determined priorities and the judgements of external inspectors whose local accountability is unclear and whose claim to superior technical knowledge remains unproven
