000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
01826naa a2200205uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
control field |
10454 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20190211155043.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
030123s1999 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
PORAC, Joseph F |
9 (RLIN) |
8553 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Industry categories and the politics of the comparable firm in CEO compensation |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
Ithaca : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Johnson Graduate School of Management, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
March 1999 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
We examine the blending of inforamtiona and political forces in organization categorizations in the context of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. By law, corporate boards are required to provide shareholders with annual justifications for their CEO pay allocations that contain an explicit performance comparison with a set of peer companies that are selected by the board. We collected and and analyzed information on the industry membership of chosen peers from a 1993 sample of 280 members of the Standard and Poor`s (S&P) 500 Our results suggest that boards anchor their comparability judgements within a firm`s primary industry, thus supporting the argument that board`s peer definitions center around commonsense industry categories. At the same time, however, we found that boards selectively define peers in self-protective ways, such that peer definitions are expanded beyond industry boundaries when firms performa poorly, industries perform well, CEOs are paid perform poorly, industries perform well, CEOs are paid highly, and when shareholders are powerful and active |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
WADE, James B |
9 (RLIN) |
19532 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
POLLOCK, Timothy G |
9 (RLIN) |
19533 |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
Title |
Administrative Science Quarterly |
Related parts |
44, 1, p. 112-144 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication |
Ithaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, March 1999 |
International Standard Serial Number |
ISSN 00018392 |
Record control number |
|
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Koha item type |
Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
-- |
20030123 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Cassio |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Cassio |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
-- |
20101027 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1628^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Carolina |