<style type="text/css"> .wpb_animate_when_almost_visible { opacity: 1; }</style> Enap catalog › MARC details for record no. 10779

Mobile capital , domestic institutions, and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy (Record no. 10779)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01740naa a2200193uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 10653
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211155120.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 030131s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name CLARK, William Roberts
9 (RLIN) 2239
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Mobile capital , domestic institutions, and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2000
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymarkers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetray expansions occur only when the eschenge rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name HALLERBERG, Mark
9 (RLIN) 17179
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title American Political Science Review
Related parts 94, 2, p. 323-346
Place, publisher, and date of publication , 2000
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20030131
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) Cassio
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Cassio
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20060724
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1621^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Quiteria
Holdings
Status de empréstimo Status de perda Status de danificação Restrição de uso Não pode ser emprestado Código da coleção Localização permanente Localização atual Data de aquisição Date last seen Preço efetivo a partir de Tipo de material
          Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos 2017-09-28 2017-09-28 2017-09-28 Periódico

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
<
Acesso à Informação TRANSPARÊNCIA

Powered by Koha