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An experimental sutyd of jury decison rules (Record no. 10833)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01586naa a2200205uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 10707
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211155135.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name GUARNASCHELLI, Serena
9 (RLIN) 4396
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title An experimental sutyd of jury decison rules
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2000
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. We present experimental results on groups facing a dicision problem analogous to that faced by a jury. We consider three treatement variables: group size (three or six), number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and pre-vot deliberation. We find evidence of strategic voting under unanimity rule: a large farction of our subjects vote for decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence. This is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Although individual behavior is explained well by ghe game theoretic model, there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision. Contraty to Feddersen and Pesendorfer, nour experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule. In the case of no deliberation, we simultaneously accont for the individual and group data using quantial response equilibrium
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name McKELVEY, Richard D
9 (RLIN) 19695
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name PALFREY, Thomas r
9 (RLIN) 19696
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title American Political Science Review
Related parts 94, 2, p. 407-424
Place, publisher, and date of publication , 2000
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20030203
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) Cassio
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Cassio
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20051124
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1445^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Quiteria
Holdings
Status de empréstimo Status de perda Status de danificação Restrição de uso Não pode ser emprestado Código da coleção Localização permanente Localização atual Data de aquisição Date last seen Preço efetivo a partir de Tipo de material
          Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos 2017-09-28 2017-09-28 2017-09-28 Periódico

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
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