| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
02157naa a2200205uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| control field |
11216 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20190211155341.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
030217s2000 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
CLARK, Ephraim |
| 9 (RLIN) |
2245 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Agency conflict and the signalling snafu un the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. |
New York : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
Marcel Dekker, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2000 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
In this paper I explore the role of signalling in the agency conflict that pits national governments against international lenders in the Mexican peso crisis of 1994. (The term international lenders includes domestic residents with the capacity to invest abroad.) I give evidence for the conventional conclusion that Mexico`s underlying economic and financial situation did not warrant the humiliating treatment inflicted on it by the international financial markets. The humiliating treatment, however, was not a mindless overreaction to suddenly perceived changes in the country`s political fragility. On the contrary, I show that the country`s evolving political fragility was recognized and compensated for as far back as 1991. It was rather the result of a rational reevaluating of the costs of the agency conflict that is inherent in the relationship between national governments through moratoriums, repudiation, or default to subordinate the claims of international lenders to thos of domestic agents. I model the conflict as a government held option to default and introduce signalling by assuming that the economy`s true situation. I then give evidence that the agency costs were reevaluated when it became clear that the Mexican government had been snding false signals to the international investment community an that these false signals had made it possible for Mexico to borrow close to or beyond the point where default was the optimal financial strategy |
| 590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN) |
|---|
| Local note |
Volume 23 |
| 590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN) |
|---|
| Local note |
Numbers 5-8 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Title |
International Journal of Public Administration - IJPA |
| Related parts |
23, 5-8, p. 837-876 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication |
New York : Marcel Dekker, 2000 |
| International Standard Serial Number |
ISSN 01900692 |
| Record control number |
|
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20030217 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Lucima |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Lucimara |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20100531 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1726^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Carolina |
