| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01716naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| control field |
11824 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20190211155645.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
030331s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
HELMKE, Gretchen |
| 9 (RLIN) |
4724 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
The logic of strategic defection : |
| Remainder of title |
court-executive relations in Argentina under dictatorship and democracy |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. |
American Political Science Association, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2002 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
Building on the separation-of-powers approach in american politics, this article develops a new micro-level account of judicial decision-making in contexts where judges face institutional insecurity. Against conventional wisdom, I argue that under certain conditions the lack of judicial independence motivates judges to strategically defect against the government once it begins losing power. The result is a reverse legal-political cycle in which antigovernment decisions cluster at the end of weak governments. Original data on more than 7.500 individual decisions by Argentine Supreme Court justices (1976-1995) are used to test hypotheses about why, when, and in which types of cases judges are likely to engage in stretegic defection. Consistent with the theory`s prediction, the results of the analysis show a significant increase in antigovernment decisions occurring at the end of weak dictatorships and weak democratic governments. Examining subsets of decisions and controlling for several additional variables further corroborate the strategic account |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Title |
American Political Science Review |
| Related parts |
96, 2, p. 291-303 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication |
American Political Science Association, 2002 |
| Record control number |
|
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20030331 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Karen |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Karen |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20060403 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1654^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Quiteria |
