Remodeling the competition for capital : (Record no. 13248)
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| fixed length control field | 01941naa a2200169uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 5061415232710 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211160002.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 050614s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | BASINGER, Scott J.; HALLERBERG, Mark |
| 9 (RLIN) | 21362 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Remodeling the competition for capital : |
| Remainder of title | how domestic politics erases the race to the bottom |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | May 2004 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a "tournament" as a substitute for the "race-to-the-bottom" model. Our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms. While coutries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms, the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries' incentives to reform regardlless of their own political costs. Domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility. We examine the capital tax policies in OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries, although their responses to reforms are mediated by theyr own domestic costs to reform. We define two potential sources of political costs of reform: transaction costs, due to presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process, abd constituency costs, due to ideological opposition to policu changes that benefit capital. Our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 98, 2, p. 261-276 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York : Cambridge University Press, May 2004 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0003-0554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20050614 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1523^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
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