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Political insecurity and the diffusion of financial market regulation (Record no. 13434)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01989naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 5082617111917
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211160056.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 050826s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name WAY, Christopher R
9 (RLIN) 16625
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Political insecurity and the diffusion of financial market regulation
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Thousand Oaks :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. SAGE,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. March 2005
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Explanations for the international apread of financial market liberalization have emphasized either "topdown" mechanisms (globalization, pressure from international organizations and the United States) or "botm-up" mechanisms focusing on domestic coalitions (derived from configurations of economic interests). In contrast to these broadly structural approaches that deemphasize the coices of individuals, this article focuses on the incentives facing office-mechanisms of diffusion by emphasizing the incentives facing office-seeeking leaders. It argues that politically insecure leaders are potent agents of diffusion because they are particulary likely to "learn" the lessons of financial market reform an emulate the liberalizing practices of others for two reasons. First, the hefty economic boom often associated with financial liberalization provides a tempting way to buttress their near-term grip on power. As they observe other nations in their region experiencing a boom, leaders fearful of losing office will jump on the liberalization bandwagon, accelerating regional reform cascades. Second, insecure governments may be particularly susceptible to pressure from international organizations: They have motivated biases to bellieve the efficiency claims of liberalizers and strong reasons to seek approval for their policies.
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science
Related parts 598, p. 125-144
Place, publisher, and date of publication Thousand Oaks : SAGE, March 2005
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 00027162
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20050826
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1711^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Analuiza
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100803
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1033^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Carolina

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