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Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work : (Record no. 13708)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01746naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 5092917510417
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211160151.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 050929s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name GELMAN, Andrew; KATZ, Jonathan N.; BAFUMI, Joseph
9 (RLIN) 21946
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work :
Remainder of title an empirical analysis
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. October 2004
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf are derived, explicity or implicity, from the assumption that all votes are equally likely (i.e., random voting). That assumption implies that the probability of a vote being decisive in a jurisdiction with n voteres is proportional to 1/n. In this article the authors show how this hypothesis has been empirically tested and rejected using data from various US and European elections. They find that the probability proportional to 1/n. The random voting model (and, more generally, the square-root rule) overestimates the probability of close elections in larger jurisdictions. As a result, classical voting power indexes make voters in large jurisdictions appear more powerful than they really are. The most important political implication of their result is that proportionally weighted voting systems (that is, each jurisdiction gets a number of votes proportional to n) are basically fair. This contradicts the claim in the voting power literature that weights should be aproximately proportional to n
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title British Journal of Political Science
Related parts 34, 4, p. 657-674
Place, publisher, and date of publication Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, October 2004
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 007-1234
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20050929
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1751^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Analuiza
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20050930
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1549^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Analuiza

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