Political Institutions and Corruption : (Record no. 13731)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01857naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 5100318174417 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211160157.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 051003s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | GERRING, John; THACKER, Strom C |
| 9 (RLIN) | 21966 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Political Institutions and Corruption : |
| Remainder of title | the role of unitarism and parliamentarism |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cambridge : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | April 2004 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | A raft of new research on the causes and effects of political corruption has emerged in recent years, in tandem with a separate, growing focus on the effects of political institutions on important outcomes such as economic growth, social equality and political stability. Yet we know little about the possible role of different political corruption. This article examines the impact of territorial sovereignty (unitary or federal) and the composition of the executive (parliamentary or presidential) on levels of perceived political corruption cross-nationally. We find that unitary and parliamentary forms of government help reduce levels of corruption. To explain this result, we explore a series of seven potential causal mechanisms that emerge out the competing centralist and decentralist theoretical paradigms: (1) openess, transparency and information costs, (2) intergovernmental competition, (3) localism, (4) party competition, (5) decision rules, (6) collective action problems, and (7) public administration. Our empirical findings and our analysis of causal mechanisms suggest that centralized constitutions help foster lower levels of political corruption |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | British Journal of Poitical Science |
| Related parts | 34, 2, p. 295-330 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, April 2004 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0007-1234 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20051003 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1817^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Analuiza |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20051004 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1358^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Analuiza |
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