An Empirical Theory of Rational Nominating Behavior Applied to Japanese DIstrict Elections (Record no. 14002)
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| fixed length control field | 01995naa a2200169uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 5110717345317 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211160212.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 051107s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | BROWNE, Eric C.; PATTERSON, Dennis |
| 9 (RLIN) | 22334 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | An Empirical Theory of Rational Nominating Behavior Applied to Japanese DIstrict Elections |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cambridge : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | April 1999 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Plurality elctoral systems with multi-member districts and single nontransferable votes (SNTV) allow parties to win multiple seats in district elections by nominating multiple candidates, but they also penalize a party's seat share if the number of candidates offered is 'too many' or 'too few'. Given an institutional incentive to nominate the 'correct' number of candidates, we seek to establish empirically that the nominating behavior of parties in such systems results from a rational calculus of strategic choice. So we develop and test an empirical theory of rational nominating behavior applied to Japanese district elections before the 1994 electoral reform. We establish, for all possible nominating strategies, the conditions on voting outcomes required for actors to maximize benefits in the context. The efficiency of actual strategy choices for maximizing benefits is found by comparing an observed outcome from voting (the distributed benefit) with the benefit that would be expected had the party chosen its 'best' alternative nominating strategy instead. Empirical testing indicates the Japanese parties discriminated between available nominating strategies and made choices that maximized benefits in the context, evidence that the nominating behavior of parties in this test environment was based on rational calculation |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | British Journal of Political Science |
| Related parts | 29, 2, p. 259-289 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, April 1999 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0007-1234 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20051107 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1734^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Analuiza |
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