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A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Politics of Taking It in Turns (Record no. 14078)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01812naa a2200169uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 5111116521417
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211160235.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 051111s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name WARD, Hugh
9 (RLIN) 22397
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Politics of Taking It in Turns
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. April 1998
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Taking in turns is an endemic feature of political and social life. For instance, in a democratic system parties take turns in office according to the outcome of elections. Despite its empirical importance, taking it in turns has received virtually no attention from rational choice theorists. First, a general definition of taking it in turns is given. Secondly, the conditions for taking it in turns to be stable and efficient in Prisioners' Dilemma, Chicken, and Co-ordination supergames are discussed. The key result is that, where stable adherence of others, players will stick with the pattern if they get their turn often enough. The precise conditions are shown to depend on the payoff structure and the discount rate. Potential problems are identified with initiating stable taking it in turn because of the existence of multiple equilibria and players' desire to get a table taking it in turns pattern that gives them a high expected payoff. The paradigmaic version of this problem is who goes first when two players alternate between getting a high and a low payoff. The applicability of the results is illustrated by considering the questions of democratic stability and transitions to democracy
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title British Journal of Political Science
Related parts 28, 2, p. 355-387
Place, publisher, and date of publication Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, April 1998
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 0007-1234
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20051111
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1652^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Analuiza

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