Wage Bargaining, Hard Money and Economic Performance : (Record no. 14081)
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| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 5111410025117 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211160236.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 051114s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | IVERSEN, Torben |
| 9 (RLIN) | 5092 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Wage Bargaining, Hard Money and Economic Performance : |
| Remainder of title | theory and evidence for organized market economies |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cambridge : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | January 1998 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The political and economic couplings between wage bargaining institutions and macro-economic policy regimes are explored in this article. It is argued that in advanced industrialized democracies with well-organized unions and employers' associations, macro-economic performance (especially unemployment) is the outcome of an interaction between the centralization of the wage bargaining system and the monetary policy regima. Thus, a decentralized gargaining system in which the government is credicly commited to a non-accommodating monetary policy rule poses an institutional alternative to a centralized mode of wage regulation where thw government anjoys macro-economic policy flexibility. Based on time-series data from ten highly organized market economies, I show that both of these institutional 'equilibria' produce superior employment performance, but also that the two systems are associated with very different distributional outcomes, and that they are supported by different coalitions of organized interests. In addition to predicting economic outcomes, the proposed model provides a theoretical framework for analysing institutional change in wage bargaind systems and in macro-economic policy regimes |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | British Journal of Political Science |
| Related parts | 28, 1, p. 31-61 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, January 1998 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0007-1234 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20051114 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1002^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Analuiza |
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