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Pluralistic Ignorance in Corporate Boards and Firms' Strategic Persistence in Response to Low Firm Performance (Record no. 14917)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02185naa a2200193uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 6032013215821
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211160642.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 060320s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name WESTPHAL, James D.
9 (RLIN) 11307
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Pluralistic Ignorance in Corporate Boards and Firms' Strategic Persistence in Response to Low Firm Performance
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Ithaca, NY :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cornell Johnson Scholl of Management,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. June 2005
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This study examines how a social psychological bias referred to as pluralistic ignorance may occur in corporate boards and how this bias could contribute to strategic persistence in response to relatively low firm performance. Our theory suggests that under conditions of low performance, there may be a systematic tendency for outside directors to underestimate the extent to which fellow directors share their concerns about the viability of the firm's corporate strategy. This reduces the propensity for individual directors to express their concerns about the current corporate strategy in board meetings, decreasing the likelihood that boards will initiate strategic change in response to low firm performance. We also posit factors that may moderate the extent to which pluralistic ignorance occurs on boards. We suggest that demographic homogeneity among outside directors (with respect to gender, functional background, education, and industry of employment) and the density of friendship ties among them will significantly moderate the occurrence of pluralistic ignorance on boards. We test our hypotheses with original survey data from a large sample of outside directors at medium-sized U.S. companies and find support for our theory. We discuss contributions of our theory and findings to the literatures on corporate governance, strategic persistence and change, and group decision-making processes in organizations.
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name BEDNAR, Michael K.
9 (RLIN) 23308
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Administrative Science Quarterly
Related parts 50, 2, p. 262-298
Place, publisher, and date of publication Ithaca, NY : Cornell Johnson Scholl of Management, June 2005
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 0001-8392
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20060320
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1321^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Natália
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20081103
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1541^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Zailton

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