Why governments comply : (Record no. 15193)
[ view plain ]
000 -LEADER | |
---|---|
fixed length control field | 02109naa a2200229uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 6032709482621 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20190211160813.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 060327s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | BEACH, Derek |
9 (RLIN) | 23808 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Why governments comply : |
Remainder of title | an integrative compliance model that bridges the gap between instrumental and normative models of compliance |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Philadelphia, PA : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Routledge, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2005 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Why do governments comply with costly rulings handed down by international courts? This article focuses upon governmental compliance with ECJ rulings. The argument is that we cannot explain compliance based solely upon the instrumental calculations of actors, but must also incorporate the normative dimension of law into our compliance model to explain why actors feel 'compelled' to follow ECJ rulings even in the absence of manifest instrumental incentives. At the same time we must not lose sight of the significant analytical insights of instrumental models. An integrative compliance model is therefore created based upon Giddens' structuration theory which argues that both instrumental and normative concerns motivate governmental actors in their compliance calculations. The analytical value-added of the model is illustrated upon the Working Time Directive case, where the instrumental strategy of the British government was blatant non-compliance, but where the social costs of breaking what was perceived to be 'the law' weighed greater. The conclusions discuss the broader applicability of the integrative compliance model to broader patterns of compliance in the EU, and governmental compliance with the rulings of other international courts. |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | European Court of Justice |
9 (RLIN) | 23809 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Governmental compliance |
9 (RLIN) | 23810 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Social constructivism |
9 (RLIN) | 17104 |
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
Topical term or geographic name entry element | Working Time Directive case |
9 (RLIN) | 23811 |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | Journal of European Public Policy |
Related parts | 12, 1, p. 113 - 142 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | Philadelphia, PA : Routledge, 2005 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 1350-1763 |
Record control number | |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20060327 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 0948^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20100622 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1158^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.