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Perverse Accountability : (Record no. 15545)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01631naa a2200169uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 6041309435521
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211161011.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 060413s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name STOKES, Susan C.
9 (RLIN) 24449
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Perverse Accountability :
Remainder of title A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. New York, NY :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. American Political Science Association,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. August 2005
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from the machine, voters are able to renege, accepting benefits and then voting as they choose. To explain how machine politics works, I observe that machines use their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' votes. When parties influence how people vote by threatening to punish them for voting for another party, I call this accountability. I analyze the strategic interaction between machines and voters as an iterated prisoners' dilemma game with one-sided uncertainty. The game generates hypotheses about the impact of the machine's capacity to monitor voters, and of voters' incomes and ideological stances, on the effectiveness of machine politics. I test these hypotheses with data from Argentina.
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title American Political Science Review
Related parts 99, 3, p. 315-325
Place, publisher, and date of publication New York, NY : American Political Science Association, August 2005
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 0003-0554
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20060413
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 0943^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Natália

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