Stability and Rigidity : (Record no. 15551)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01686naa a2200169uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 6041310030321 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211161014.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 060413s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | ROSENDORFF, B.Peter |
| 9 (RLIN) | 19473 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Stability and Rigidity : |
| Remainder of title | Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | American Political Science Association, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | August 2005 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The increased legalization embodied in the revised Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is shown to be an institutional innovation that increases the opportunities for states to temporarily suspend their obligations in periods of unexpected, but heightened, domestic political pressure for protection. This increased flexibility in the system reduces per-period cooperation among states but also reduces the possibility that the regime may break down entirely. There is shown to be a trade-off between rigidity and stability in international institutional design in the face of unforeseen, but occasionally intense, domestic political pressure. In a model with a WTO that serves both an informational and adjudicatory role, it is established that agreements with DSPs are self-enforcing, are more stable, and are more acceptable to a wider variety of countries than agreements without DSPs. Evidence drawn from data on preferential trading agreements supports the key hypotheses. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 99, 3, p. 389-400 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : American Political Science Association, August 2005 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0003-0554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20060413 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1003^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
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