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Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks (Record no. 20647)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01741naa a2200193uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 6121317181121
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211161650.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 061213s1996 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name ZAJAC, Edward J.
9 (RLIN) 16686
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Ithaca :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Johnson Graduate School of Management,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. September 1996
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This study advances research on CEO-based relationships, interlocking directorates, and directors reputation by examining how contests for intraorganizational power can affect interorganizational ties. We propose that powerful top managers seek to maintain their control by selecting and retaining board members with experience on other, passive boards and excluding individuals with experience on more active boards. We also propose that powerful boards similarly seek to maintain their control by favoring directors with a reputation for more actively monitoring management and avoiding directors with experience on passive boards. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally using CEO-board data taken from 491 of the largest US corporations over a recent seven-year period. The findings suggest that variation in CEO-board power relationship across organizations has contributed to a segmentation of the corporate director network. We discuss how our on whether increased board control has diffused across large US corporations
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name WESTPHAL, James D
9 (RLIN) 11307
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Administrative Science Quarterly
Related parts 41, 3, p. 507-529
Place, publisher, and date of publication Ithaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, September 1996
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 00018392
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20061213
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1718^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Natália
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20101108
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1554^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Carolina

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