Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks (Record no. 20647)
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000 -LEADER | |
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fixed length control field | 01741naa a2200193uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 6121317181121 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20190211161650.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 061213s1996 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | ZAJAC, Edward J. |
9 (RLIN) | 16686 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Ithaca : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Johnson Graduate School of Management, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | September 1996 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | This study advances research on CEO-based relationships, interlocking directorates, and directors reputation by examining how contests for intraorganizational power can affect interorganizational ties. We propose that powerful top managers seek to maintain their control by selecting and retaining board members with experience on other, passive boards and excluding individuals with experience on more active boards. We also propose that powerful boards similarly seek to maintain their control by favoring directors with a reputation for more actively monitoring management and avoiding directors with experience on passive boards. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally using CEO-board data taken from 491 of the largest US corporations over a recent seven-year period. The findings suggest that variation in CEO-board power relationship across organizations has contributed to a segmentation of the corporate director network. We discuss how our on whether increased board control has diffused across large US corporations |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | WESTPHAL, James D |
9 (RLIN) | 11307 |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | Administrative Science Quarterly |
Related parts | 41, 3, p. 507-529 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | Ithaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, September 1996 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 00018392 |
Record control number | |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20061213 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1718^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20101108 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1554^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
No items available.