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Why Should We Be Beggars with the Ballot in Our Hand? Veto Players and the Failure of Land Value Taxation in the United Kingdom, 1909–14 (Record no. 20994)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01672naa a2200193uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 6122115470321
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211161921.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 061221s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name MCLEAN, Iain
9 (RLIN) 29403
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Why Should We Be Beggars with the Ballot in Our Hand? Veto Players and the Failure of Land Value Taxation in the United Kingdom, 1909–14
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. New York, NY :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. October 2006
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Recent veto player work argues that majoritarian regimes such as the United Kingdom have better fiscal discipline and smaller welfare states than proportional regimes with more veto players. An analytic narrative of the failure of land value taxation in the United Kingdom between 1909 and 1914 shows, however, that it failed not because of previously advanced reasons, but because the number of veto players in British politics was sharply increased. This increase in veto player numbers prevented a tax increase. All seven of the conventional reasons for characterizing the United Kingdom as a low-n veto player regime failed to hold between 1906 and 1914. Observable implications discussed include the need to review the entire history of British politics in this period in the light of the temporary increase in veto players; and the ambiguous implications of number of veto players for fiscal discipline.
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name NOU, Jennifer
9 (RLIN) 29404
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title British Journal of Political Science
Related parts 36, 4, p. 575-591
Place, publisher, and date of publication New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, October 2006
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 0007-1234
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20061221
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1547^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Natália
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20081031
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1103^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Zailton

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