Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation : (Record no. 20996)
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|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02619naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 6122116020421 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211161922.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 061221s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | NETO, Octavio Amorim |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29407 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation : |
| Remainder of title | Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | October 2006 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Europe has over the past century experienced an impressive increase in the number of presidential heads of state. Many of the new democracies since the mid-1970s are semi-presidential regimes that combine a popularly elected president with the traditional features of parliamentary democracy. At the same time, the frequency of the appointment of non-partisan cabinet members has risen. Cabinet appointments are the most important personnel decisions in parliamentary systems, and traditionally such appointments have been virtually monopolized by the governing political parties. Under semi-presidentialism, however, cabinet appointments may instead become a tug-of-war between a prime minister and a president with different partisan preferences. In this article the relationship between presidential power and the incidence of non-partisan cabinet appointments is examined and a game-theoretic model of cabinet appointments in parliamentary systems with a strong president is developed. In this model the prime minister has proposal power over cabinet appointments and the president an ex post veto. This model yields three comparative statics predictions concerning non-partisan cabinet appointments. The incidence of such appointments should covary positively with the president's powers and negatively with the prime minister's electoral prospects. The likelihood of such appointments should also correlate in a non-intuitive way with the value that the president and the prime minister attach to non-partisan appointees. Based on these results, eight operational hypotheses are developed, which are tested against a sample of 134 European cabinets representing twelve semi-presidential and twelve purely parliamentary regimes in the 1990s. Significant empirical support is found for all three comparative statics results and for most of the specific hypotheses. |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | STRØM, Kaare |
| 9 (RLIN) | 10409 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | British Journal of Political Science |
| Related parts | 36, 4, p. 619-643 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, October 2006 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0007-1234 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20061221 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1602^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20081031 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1104^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
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