When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War : (Record no. 20997)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01850naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 6122116083821 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211161922.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 061221s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | LANGLOIS, Catherine C. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29408 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War : |
| Remainder of title | Rational Escalation and the Failure of Bargaining |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | October 2006 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Why would fully informed, rational actors fight over possession of a valued asset when they could negotiate a settlement in peace? Our explanation of the decision to fight highlights the incentives that are present when the defender holds a valued asset coveted by the challenger. The defender receives utility from possession of the contested asset and sees any compromise as a loss that is lower if postponed. The challenger, instead, sees any compromise as a gain that is more valuable if reached earlier. Faced with the defender's vested interest in the status quo, the challenger needs to threaten war and may have no choice but to implement the threat to force a settlement. For the defender, the threat of war is a deterrent that might incite the challenger to back down. In the perfect equilibria that we describe, the players' ability to threaten each other credibly allows them to maintain incompatible bargaining positions instead of helping them narrow their differences. But the very credibility of these threats leads our rivals to engage in what can become lengthy protracted wars. |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | LANGLOIS, Jean-Pierre P. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29409 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | British Journal of Political Science |
| Related parts | 36, 4, p. 645-669 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, October 2006 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0007-1234 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20061221 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1608^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20081031 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1104^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
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