Fiscal policy outcomes and electoral accountability in American states (Record no. 21198)
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| control field | 7010412593721 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211162045.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 070104s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | LOWRY, Robert C. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29651 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Fiscal policy outcomes and electoral accountability in American states |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | December 1998 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Clear fiscal policy effects appear in American state gubernatorial and legislative elections between 1968 and 1992, independent of the effects of incumbency, coattails, term limits, and macroeconomic conditions. The results show that accountability is generally stronger following a period of unified party control than under divided government. Voter reactions to taxes and spending relative to the state economy are conditional on expectations, which differ for each party. Net of these expectations, Republican gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated increases in the size of the state budget; Democrats do not and, indeed, may be rewarded for small increases. Independent of this, the incumbent governor's party is punished in legislative elections for failing to maintain fiscal balance. Taken together, these results show how electoral accountability for fiscal policy outcomes is strong but highly contingent on a complex configuration of party labels, partisan control, expectations and institutions. |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | ALT, James E. |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29652 |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | FERREE, Karen E |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29653 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 92, 4, p. 759-774 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1998 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0003-0554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20070104 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1259^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20070105 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1724^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
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