A political explanation of variations in Central Bank independence (Record no. 21249)
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| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 7010515215021 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211162110.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 070105s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | BERNHARD, William |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29703 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | A political explanation of variations in Central Bank independence |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | June 1998 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Across the industrial democracies, central banks perform a similar function: to implement the government's monetary policy by regulating the supply of money and credit to the economy. Nevertheless, the structures of these bureaucratic institutions - their levels of independence - differ across systems. This variation presents a puzzle. On the one hand, independent central banks limit the ability of governments to manipulate monetary policy for their own short-term gain, which implies that governments would never choose an independent central bank. On the other hand, empirical research demonstrates that independent central banks are associated with superior inflation performance, which suggests that all countries would have an independent bank to improve their economies (Alesina 1989; Alesina and Summers 1993; Burdekin and Willett 1991; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991; Havrilesky and Granato 1993; Neumann 1991). |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 92, 2, p. 311-328 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, June 1998 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0003-0554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20070105 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1521^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20070105 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1716^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
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