Crime and punishment : (Record no. 21320)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01782naa a2200169uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 7010813113821 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211162146.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 070108s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | GELPI, Christopher |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29779 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Crime and punishment : |
| Remainder of title | the role of norms in crisis bargaining |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | June 1997 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | In this work I test the proposition that normative standards of behavior can influence state actions in security-related conflicts. Specifically, I examine the construction of norms in the settlements of security-related disputes and the effects these settlements have on subsequent militarized interactions. I argue that dispute settlements alter subsequent crisis bargaining in two important ways. First, they act as normative referents that alter the interpretation of subsequent crisis bargaining behavior both by identifying a solution to the dispute which alleviates fears of demands for future concessions and by defining a set of acts which both sides consider illegitimate. Second, in combination with the response to their violation, dispute settlements inflict reputational costs on states that violate them. I test these arguments against a realist theory of crisis bargaining through an analysis of 122 reinitiated international crises between 1929 and 1979. I find strong support for the hypothesis that stases can and do construct normative standards that guide their behavior in international crises, whereas realist theory receives only mixed support. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 91, 2, p. 339-360 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, June 1997 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0003-0554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20070108 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1311^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
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