Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation (Record no. 21341)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01680naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 7010815500121 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20220608172202.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 070108s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MESQUITA, Bruce Bueno de |
| 9 (RLIN) | 7148 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York, NY : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | March 1997 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty. We model crises as a game of two-sided incomplete information. Players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities. We derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970. We show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ant observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We answer five questions: (1) How do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence? (2) How do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence? (3) What do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises? (4) Under what conditions can deterrence succeed? (5) Under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis? |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 19697 |
| Personal name | Morrow, James D. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 91, 1, p. 15-27 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, March 1997 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0003-0554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20070108 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1550^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Natália |
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