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Uncertainty, shifting power, and appeasement (Record no. 21825)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01463naa a2200169uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 7011615521110
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211162307.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 070116s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name POWELL, Robert
9 (RLIN) 21361
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Uncertainty, shifting power, and appeasement
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. New York, NY :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. December 1996
650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Great Britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930´s, and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in wich a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state´s demands rather than go to war to oppose them. If, however, the rising state´s demands are unlimited, the the declining state prefers figthing. And, given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time, it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be war. This situation creates a trad-off: The earlier a state stands firm, the stronger it will be if war ensues, but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war. In equilibrium, the declining state generally tries to appease te rising state by making a series of concessions
9 (RLIN) 30328
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title American Political Science Review
Related parts 90, 4, p. 749-764
Place, publisher, and date of publication New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1996
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 0003-0554
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20070116
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1552^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Tiago

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