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Government´s credible commitment in economic policy-making : (Record no. 23586)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02478naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 7052317124910
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211162939.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 070523s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name YAP, O. Fiona
9 (RLIN) 31948
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Government´s credible commitment in economic policy-making :
Remainder of title evidence from Singapore
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Dordrecht, Netherlands :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Springer,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. December 2003
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Studies of participatory policy-making show citizens participation in policy-making yield better solutions and more successful policy performance. But studies of the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan attribute the successful economic policies and performance of these NICs to strong governments that limit citizens participation or ignore their policy preferences. Are the Asian-NICs unique? This paper examines Singapore between the 1960s and 1990s to show empirically that, contrary to findings in Asian studies, the government bargains by credibly committing to include and realize private sector input. This government bargaining through credible commitment alleviates production investors concerns that government may arbitrarily set policies or even seize property. The governments bargaining conforms to the following pattern: When the economy performs optimally, the government does nothing; however, when it is less-than-optimal, the government compensates production investors or demotes or replaces its representatives or agents, and increases private sector participation in monitoring, evaluation or modification of the governments policies. This evidence of government bargaining advances existing scholarship in important ways. First, it provides a theoretical framework to understand if, how, and when government bargains with resource owners in the less-democratic NICs. In particular, the framework reveals how government bargaining may be credible despite the lack of formal constraints in these countries. Second, it shows that policy success in the Asian-NICs is the result of government bargaining with resource owners and not the result of limiting participation. This credible commitments argument, then, provides a new perspective on policy success in the NICs
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Policy Sciences
Related parts 36, 3-4, p. 237-255
Place, publisher, and date of publication Dordrecht, Netherlands : Springer, December 2003
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 0032-2867
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20070523
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1712^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Tiago
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20070604
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1425^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Zailton

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