<style type="text/css"> .wpb_animate_when_almost_visible { opacity: 1; }</style> Enap catalog › MARC details for record no. 24726

Outsourcing oversight : (Record no. 24726)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02103naa a2200205uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 7100816271710
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211163205.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 071008s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name MARVEL, Mary K.
9 (RLIN) 32868
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Outsourcing oversight :
Remainder of title a comparison of monitoring for in-house and contracted services
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Malden, MA :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Blackwell Publishers,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. May / June 2007
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. The public sector contracting literature has long argued that outsourced services need to be and, in fact, are subject to a more elevated level of scrutiny compared to internally delivered services. Recently, the performance measurement and management literature has suggested that the twin themes of accountability and results have altered the management landscape at all levels of government. By focusing on performance monitoring, the implication is that monitoring levels for internally provided services should more closely approximate those for contracted services. The analysis provided here yields empirical comparisons of how governments monitor the same service provided in-house and contracted out. We find evidence that services provided internally by a government’s own employees are indeed monitored intensively by the contracting government, with levels of monitoring nearly as high as those for services contracted out to for-profit providers. In contrast, however, we find strong evidence that performance monitoring by the contracting government does not extend to nonprofit and other governmental service providers, each of which is monitored much less intensively than when comparable services are provided internally. For such service providers, it appears that monitoring is either outsourced along with services, or simply reduced
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Public administration review PAR
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name MARVEL, Howard P
9 (RLIN) 32869
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Public Administration Review: PAR
Related parts 67, 3, p. 521-530
Place, publisher, and date of publication Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, May / June 2007
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 00333352
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20071008
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1627^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Tiago
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20090608
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1714^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) mayze

No items available.

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
<
Acesso à Informação TRANSPARÊNCIA

Powered by Koha