Central banking reform and overcoming the moral hazard problem : (Record no. 25319)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01900naa a2200229uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 7121320173119 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190212105828.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 071213s2001 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | por |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | SOLA, Lourder |
| 9 (RLIN) | 33354 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Central banking reform and overcoming the moral hazard problem : |
| Remainder of title | the case of Brasil |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | São Paulo : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Editora 34, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | jul./set./2001 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The implicit assumption that governments will bailout financial institutuons under distress can generate negative incentives for the development of a sound financial system. This paper begins from the premise that these negative incentives, which create a situation of moral bazard, is essentially a political problem rather than a technical problem over generating correct institutional incentives. In the brazilian case, we argue the current administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso was only able to significantly reduce its moral bazard problem in the financial sector through distancing its political relationship with two important political actors: the private financial state governors. The ability of the government to eliminate the implicit assumption of an eventual Central Bank bailout over public and private commiercial banks was only made possible through a series of political conditions, which includes the end of hvper-inflation under the Real Plan, that reduced the government's dependence upon those two important political actors |
| 590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN) | |
| Local note | Revista de Economia Política 2001 |
| 590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN) | |
| Local note | v. 21, n. 3(83) |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | GARAMAN, Christopher da Cunha Bueno |
| 9 (RLIN) | 33355 |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MARQUES, Moisés S |
| 9 (RLIN) | 33356 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy |
| Related parts | 21, 3, p. 40-64 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | São Paulo : Editora 34, jul./set./2001 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 01013157 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20071213 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 2017^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Mariana |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20140205 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1538^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | karina |
No items available.
