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Does dispersed public ownership impair effciency? : (Record no. 25637)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01662naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8013114482810
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211163422.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 080131s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name SORENSEN, Rune J
9 (RLIN) 33619
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Does dispersed public ownership impair effciency? :
Remainder of title the case of refuse collection in Norway
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Malden, MA :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Blackwell Publishers,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. December 2007
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Corporate governance theory suggests that companies with dispersed and indirect ownership suffer from agency costs. A worst case is where several political authorities jointly own a company, which allows managers to operate with inferior efficiency. In political economy, the manager is not the major agency problem. Elected politicians may impair efficiency to improve their re-election prospects. Since politicians have less influence in jointly owned firms, such companies are expected to perform better than those owned by a single public authority.
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Consistent with corporate governance – but not political economy – the empirical analysis suggests that dispersed municipal ownership impairs cost efficiency. In the Norwegian case of municipal refuse collection presented here, costs of dispersed ownership often outstrip gains from economies of scale. Use of jointly owned companies is not necessarily a proper response to efficiency problems inherent a fragmented local government structure
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Public Administration : an international quarterly
Related parts 85, 4, p. 1045-1058
Place, publisher, and date of publication Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, December 2007
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 00333298
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20080131
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1448^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Tiago

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Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

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