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Interesses eleitorais e flutuações de preços em mercados regulados (Record no. 25690)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01737naa a2200205uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8021911384019
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190212110314.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 080219s1994 bl ||||gr |0|| 0 por d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title por
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name PAIVA, Claudio A. C.
9 (RLIN) 33663
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Interesses eleitorais e flutuações de preços em mercados regulados
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. São Paulo :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Nobel,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. out./dez. 1994
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This paper builds on the theory of regulation developed by Stigler and Peltzman. According to these authors, a regulator chooses his/her strategy seeking to maximize political support from consumers and producers, viewing welfare and efficiency as secondary issues. This process determines a regulated price that is between the competitive and monopolistic levels. Our paper develops a modified version of Peltzman’s model by considering the idea that the regulator’s behavior might change with the proximity of elections. The addition of a timing dimension to the problem and its implication for consumers, producers and the regulator’s behavior suggest that the optimal strategy now implies in a price cycle in regulated industries. The regulator has incentives to impose higher prices when elections are relatively far ahead and lower (real) prices in periods that immediately precede an important election. We show that the Brazilian gasoline market between 1969-1984 supports our results
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Revista de Economia Política 1994
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note v. 14, n. 4(56)
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy
Related parts 14, 4, p. 31-40
Place, publisher, and date of publication São Paulo : Nobel, out./dez. 1994
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 01013157
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20080219
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1138^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Mariana
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20140217
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1439^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) karina

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