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The Law of k/n : (Record no. 25862)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01686naa a2200193uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8030718540310
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211163500.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name CHEN, Jowei
9 (RLIN) 33789
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title The Law of k/n :
Remainder of title the effect of chamber size on government spending in bicameral legislatures
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. New York :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. November 2007
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Recent work in political economics has examined the positive relationship between legislative size and spending, which Weingast et al. (1981) formalized as the law of 1/n. However, empirical tests of this theory have produced a pattern of divergent findings. The positive relationship between seats and spending appears to hold consistently for unicameral legislatures and for upper chambers in bicameral legislatures but not for lower chambers. We bridge this gap between theory and empirics by extending Weingast et al.'s model to account for bicameralism in the context of a Baron–Ferejohn bargaining game. Our comparative statics predict, and empirical data from U.S. state legislatures corroborate, that the size of the upper chamber (n) is a positive predictor of expenditure, whereas the ratio of lower-to-upper chamber seats (k) exhibits a negative effect. We refer to these relationships as the law of k/n, as the two variables influence spending in opposite directions
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name MALHOTRA, Neil
9 (RLIN) 33790
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title American Political Science Review
Related parts 101, 4, p. 657-676
Place, publisher, and date of publication New York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 00030554
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20080307
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1854^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Tiago
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20081113
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1013^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Zailton

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