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Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? (Record no. 25865)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02237naa a2200217uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8030719011010
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211163501.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name HABYARIMANA, James
9 (RLIN) 33794
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. New York :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. November 2007
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. A large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision. Yet although the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through which this relationship operates. We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name HUNPHREYS, Macartan
9 (RLIN) 33795
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name POSNER, Daniel N.
9 (RLIN) 29436
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name WEINSTEIN, Jeremy M
9 (RLIN) 11254
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title American Political Science Review
Related parts 101, 4, p. 709-725
Place, publisher, and date of publication New York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 00030554
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20080307
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1901^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Tiago
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20081113
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1013^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Zailton

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