Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? (Record no. 25865)
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001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 8030719011010 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20190211163501.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | HABYARIMANA, James |
9 (RLIN) | 33794 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | November 2007 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | A large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision. Yet although the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through which this relationship operates. We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provisionwhat we term preferences, technology, and strategy selection mechanismsand run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | HUNPHREYS, Macartan |
9 (RLIN) | 33795 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | POSNER, Daniel N. |
9 (RLIN) | 29436 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | WEINSTEIN, Jeremy M |
9 (RLIN) | 11254 |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | American Political Science Review |
Related parts | 101, 4, p. 709-725 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 00030554 |
Record control number | |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20080307 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1901^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20081113 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1013^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
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