Allocating defensive resources with private information about vulnerability (Record no. 25870)
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000 -LEADER | |
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fixed length control field | 01824naa a2200181uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 8030719104410 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20190211163504.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | POWELL, Robert |
9 (RLIN) | 21361 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Allocating defensive resources with private information about vulnerability |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | November 2007 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | In many resources-allocation problems, strategic adversaries move sequentially and are likely to have private information about the effectiveness of their spending. A defender, for example, often has to allocate its defensive resources before an attacker (e.g., a terrorist group) decides where to strike. Defenders are also likely to have private information about the vulnerability of the things they are trying to protect. Sequential decisions and private information about effectiveness creates a dilemma for a defender. Allocating more to a highly vulnerable site reduces the expected losses should that site be attacked but may also signal that that site is more vulnerable and thereby increase the probability of an attack. Modeling this tradeoff as a signaling game, the analysis shows that secrecy concerns generally swamp vulnerability concerns when more vulnerable sites are weakly harder to protect on the margin. The defender pools in equilibrium, that is, allocates its resources in the same way, regardless of the level of vulnerability. If more vulnerable sites are easier to protect on the margin, vulnerability concerns may swamp secrecy concerns |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | American Political Science Review |
Related parts | 101, 4, p. 799-809 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 00030554 |
Record control number | |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20080307 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1910^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20081113 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1015^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
No items available.