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Allocating defensive resources with private information about vulnerability (Record no. 25870)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01824naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8030719104410
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211163504.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name POWELL, Robert
9 (RLIN) 21361
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Allocating defensive resources with private information about vulnerability
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. New York :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. November 2007
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. In many resources-allocation problems, strategic adversaries move sequentially and are likely to have private information about the effectiveness of their spending. A defender, for example, often has to allocate its defensive resources before an attacker (e.g., a terrorist group) decides where to strike. Defenders are also likely to have private information about the vulnerability of the things they are trying to protect. Sequential decisions and private information about effectiveness creates a dilemma for a defender. Allocating more to a highly vulnerable site reduces the expected losses should that site be attacked but may also signal that that site is more vulnerable and thereby increase the probability of an attack. Modeling this tradeoff as a signaling game, the analysis shows that secrecy concerns generally swamp vulnerability concerns when more vulnerable sites are weakly harder to protect on the margin. The defender pools in equilibrium, that is, allocates its resources in the same way, regardless of the level of vulnerability. If more vulnerable sites are easier to protect on the margin, vulnerability concerns may swamp secrecy concerns
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title American Political Science Review
Related parts 101, 4, p. 799-809
Place, publisher, and date of publication New York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 00030554
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20080307
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1910^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Tiago
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20081113
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1015^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Zailton

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