Institutions and equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court (Record no. 25871)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01667naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 8030719124810 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211163505.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 080307s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | ANDERSON IV, Robert |
| 9 (RLIN) | 33800 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Institutions and equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | November 2007 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Over the last decade the scholarship on judicial politics has increasingly emphasized the strategic aspects of decision making in the United States Supreme Court. This scholarship, however, has struggled with two significant limitationsthe restriction to unidimensional policy spaces and the assumption of binary comparisons of alternatives. These two assumptions have the advantage of implying stable, predictable outcomes, but lack a sound theoretical foundation and assume away potentially important aspects of strategic behavior on the Court. In this article, we identify institutional features of the Court that, under certain conditions, allow us to relax these two assumptions without sacrificing stable, predictable policy outcomes. In particular, we formalize the part-by-part opinion voting used by the justices, a feature that, together with separable preferences over policy issues, implies stable policy outcomes around the issue-by-issue median of the justices |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | TAHK, Alexander M |
| 9 (RLIN) | 33801 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | American Political Science Review |
| Related parts | 101, 4, p. 811-825 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York : Cambridge University Press, November 2007 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 00030554 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20080307 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1912^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20081113 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1015^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
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