Committed To Peace : (Record no. 26208)
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fixed length control field | 01996naa a2200181uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 8041715241424 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20190211163603.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 080417s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | PRINS, Brandon C |
9 (RLIN) | 34069 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Committed To Peace : |
Remainder of title | Liberal Institutions and the Termination of Rivalry |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cambridge, UK : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | January 2008 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Rivalry is characterized by mutual mistrust, anger and fear, and becomes increasingly intractable as confrontations between rivals militarize. The empirical record confirms that rivalries account for the vast number of militarized interstate disputes and wars in the international system. Although considerable attention has been spent on the initiation, duration or termination of rivalries, to date no comprehensive theoretical framework for their persistence or failure exists. Following Fearon, a rationalist explanation of rivalry termination is developed. It is argued here that the adoption of liberal institutions helps alleviate the commitment problems arising in rivalry. Free-market reform, democratic institutions and membership in international organizations all build trust and increase defection costs among rival states, and therefore help to shorten the duration of rivalry. Using a Cox proportional hazard model and Thompson's data on rivalries, it is shown that change towards democracy, as well as the joint effect of democracy and economic development increase the likelihood of rivalry termination. Also, joint membership in international organizations with mechanisms for dispute settlement reduces the duration of rivalry.Arobustness check using Diehl and Goertz's list of rivalries produces similar results |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | DAXECKER, Ursula E |
9 (RLIN) | 34070 |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | British Journal of Political Science, |
Related parts | 38, 1, p. 17-44 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, January 2008 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 0007-1234 |
Record control number | |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20080417 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1524^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
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