Political Stability Under Uncertainty : (Record no. 26209)
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| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 8041715272124 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211163604.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 080417s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MALHOTRA, Neil |
| 9 (RLIN) | 33790 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Political Stability Under Uncertainty : |
| Remainder of title | Applying Bounded Rationality to the Study of Governance and Civil Conflict |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cambridge, UK : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | January 2008 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Acentral puzzle in the comparative politics literature has been why certain societies are able to achieve political stability while others suffer from strife, repression and authoritarian rule. This article applies the solution concept of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to Weingast's Sovereign-Constituency Co-ordination Game in order to show how our understanding of political stability can be enhanced when uncertainty and limited rationality are explicitly modelled. Comparative statics results first confirm the intuitive logic that civil conflict is unlikely when regimes threaten penalties for revolt that are much more severe than current living conditions and when the benefits to a successful revolt are not sufficiently enticing. In addition, our analysis provides a logic for the outbreak of civil conflict, noting that it is most likely when key payoffs are in their intermediate regions and far from critical thresholds, resulting in ambiguous and counterintuitive decision making by leaders and citizen opposition groups |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | CARNES, Matthew E |
| 9 (RLIN) | 34071 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | British Journal of Political Science, |
| Related parts | 38, 1, p. 45-64 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, January 2008 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 1750-8762 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20080417 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1527^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
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