Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes (Record no. 26210)
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fixed length control field | 01793naa a2200181uu 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
control field | 8041715304524 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
control field | OSt |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20190211163604.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
fixed length control field | 080417s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | HELLWING, Timothy |
9 (RLIN) | 34072 |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cambridge, UK : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | January 2008 |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Do voters reward or punish incumbents for retrospective performance similarly in different democratic regimes? Despite debates on the merits of different regimes, little research has investigated the implications of constitutional design on voters' ability to hold politicians to account. This article shows that regime type determines the way and extent to which elections enable voters to reward or sanction incumbents. These regime effects are separate from and conceptually prior to factors previously identified in the literature on comparative economic voting. Analysis of elections from seventy-five countries reveals that, all else equal, voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Moreover, variables particular to separation of powers systems the electoral cycle in pure presidential systems and instances of cohabitation in semi-presidential systems affect the relative impact of the attribution of responsibility. The results contribute to ongoing debates about the relative advantages of different constitutional formats for democratic performance |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | SAMUELS, David |
9 (RLIN) | 9419 |
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
Title | British Journal of Political Science |
Related parts | 38, 1, p. 65-90 |
Place, publisher, and date of publication | Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, January 2008 |
International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 1750-8762 |
Record control number | |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
Koha item type | Periódico |
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
-- | 20080417 |
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1530^b |
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Zailton |
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