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Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes (Record no. 26210)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01793naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8041715304524
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211163604.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 080417s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name HELLWING, Timothy
9 (RLIN) 34072
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cambridge, UK :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. January 2008
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Do voters reward or punish incumbents for retrospective performance similarly in different democratic regimes? Despite debates on the merits of different regimes, little research has investigated the implications of constitutional design on voters' ability to hold politicians to account. This article shows that regime type determines the way and extent to which elections enable voters to reward or sanction incumbents. These regime effects are separate from and conceptually prior to factors previously identified in the literature on comparative economic voting. Analysis of elections from seventy-five countries reveals that, all else equal, voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Moreover, variables particular to separation of powers systems – the electoral cycle in pure presidential systems and instances of cohabitation in semi-presidential systems – affect the relative impact of the attribution of responsibility. The results contribute to ongoing debates about the relative advantages of different constitutional formats for democratic performance
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name SAMUELS, David
9 (RLIN) 9419
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title British Journal of Political Science
Related parts 38, 1, p. 65-90
Place, publisher, and date of publication Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, January 2008
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 1750-8762
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20080417
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1530^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Zailton

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