Procedural control of bureaucracy, peer review, and epistemic drift (Record no. 26447)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02164naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 8052316261110 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211163632.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 080523s2007 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | SHAPIRO, Stuart |
| 9 (RLIN) | 9845 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Procedural control of bureaucracy, peer review, and epistemic drift |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | New York : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Oxford University, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | oct. 2007 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Regulatory peer reviewin which independent scientists comment on the technical underpinnings of proposed regulationsis a recently pursued form of political control of the bureaucracy. This article situates regulatory peer review in the context of both the history of technical advice to government and the principal-agent perspective often used to explain the presence of administrative procedures. Much of the academic discussion of attempts to influence bureaucratic decision making has utilized principal-agent theory. We introduce two novel concepts to accommodate regulatory peer review into the principal-agent framework. The first is "technocracy" where the preferences of technical experts displace public preferences. The second is "epistemic drift," a change in embodied knowledge that contributes to departures from the policy intentions of an enacting coalition of policy makers. In addition to introducing these concepts, we argue that regulatory peer review is more complex than other administrative procedures and that its efficacy critically depends on the details of its implementation. We hypothesize that regulatory peer review will cause nongovernmental participants in regulatory conflicts to devote more effort to creating research and other epistemic resources. But we also hypothesize that, just as courts have become more politicized with their role in regulatory policy, peer review and regulatory science will become increasingly politicized as well |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | GUSTON, David |
| 9 (RLIN) | 34246 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART |
| Related parts | 17, 4, p. 535-552 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | New York : Oxford University, oct. 2007 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 10531858 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20080523 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1626^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20120521 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1036^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
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