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Neither shareholder nor stakeholder management : (Record no. 26637)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01799naa a2200169uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 8061019495810
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211163712.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 080610s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name VILANOVA, Laurent
9 (RLIN) 34501
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Neither shareholder nor stakeholder management :
Remainder of title what happens when firms are run for their short-term salient stakeholder?
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford, UK :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Elsevier,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. April 2007
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. One of the critical distinctions between shareholder theory and stakeholder theory rests on the role of management in the resolution of the firm’s internal conflicts. Whereas managers are considered as a source of conflicts by agency/shareholder theorists, they are often viewed as useful mediators in the stakeholder approach. This paper proposes an alternative theory on the role of management in corporate governance, the so-called short term salient stakeholder theory, and illustrates it with a longitudinal case study of Eurotunnel, the Channel Tunnel operator. When the firm’s legitimate stakeholders have very different information levels and bargaining strengths, this theory predicts that (i) firms are governed in the interests of a unique stakeholder group (ii) managers have a minor role and are prone to collude with the most powerful interest group (iii) this autocratic type of governance is unstable in the long-term as the legitimate stakeholders expropriated at one period use influence strategies to gain power in the next period (iv) the chronic conflicts associated to short-term salient stakeholder management lead to poor organizational performance
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title European Management Journal
Related parts 25, 2, p. 146-162
Place, publisher, and date of publication Oxford, UK : Elsevier, April 2007
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 02632373
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20080610
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1949^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Tiago

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