What determines how long political appointees serve? (Record no. 27300)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01718naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 8082116193710 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20190211164149.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 080821s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | WOOD, B. Dan |
| 9 (RLIN) | 29623 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | What determines how long political appointees serve? |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | London, UK : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Oxford University, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | juy 2008 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The president's role as chief executive depends on the quality and tenure of political appointees who assist with the constitutional charge to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." This study explores the determinants of the duration of political appointee service. Using an agency theory framework, we propose that appointee tenure depends on financial incentives, executive-legislative conflict, solidary, and material benefits offered by the president, as well as implicit incentives that differ across presidential administrations. Using Office of Personnel Management records from January 1982 through August 2003, we employ multivariate survival analysis to confirm most aspects of the theory. The results imply that the most important determinants of political appointee tenure are financial and the difficulty of public administrative service. However, the president can affect exit propensities at the margins by manipulating rewards and implicit incentives that promote loyalty to public service and the administration |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | MARCHBANKS III, Miner P |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35361 |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART |
| Related parts | 18, 3, p. 375-396 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | London, UK : Oxford University, juy 2008 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 10531858 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20080821 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1619^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20120521 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1042^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
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