Political insulation, information exchange, and interest group access to the bureaucracy (Record no. 27302)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01978naa a2200193uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 8082116243910 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20220323142128.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 080821s2008 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) | |
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] | PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | REENOCK, Christopher M |
| 9 (RLIN) | 35363 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Political insulation, information exchange, and interest group access to the bureaucracy |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | London, UK : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Oxford University, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | july 2008 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Under political uncertainty, legislative coalitions have incentives to insulate policy from future coalitions. While there is evidence of legislators' use of agency design to insulate the bureaucracy from elected officials, little is known about the ultimate consequences of such design choices on the policy participation of interest groups. How such design choices affect group access is important because of the centrality of groups in providing both bureaucratic accountability and information for policy development. Accordingly, we examine the consequences of the so-called "insulation game" on group access to the bureaucracy. We develop an information exchange theory that portrays the impact of agency design choices on group-reported access as a function of the level of design-induced political insulation and the quality of the information offered by a given group. We test our theory with two original datasets that include design parameters of US state environmental agencies and survey data measuring reported agency access by state-level interest groups. Our results suggest that insulating agencies via design does lead to lower reported access to regulators by interest groups, but only among those groups who supply less valuable information |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 28274 |
| Personal name | Gerber, Brian J. |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY | |
| Title | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory - JPART |
| Related parts | 18, 3, p. 415-440 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication | London, UK : Oxford University, july 2008 |
| International Standard Serial Number | ISSN 10531858 |
| Record control number | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20080821 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1624^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Tiago |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) | |
| -- | 20120521 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) | 1042^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) | Carolina |
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